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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE ST A T'E OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-YS.-
BOUNDARY SPRINGS WATER 
USERS ASSOCIATION, a Cor-
poration, JOSEPH M. TRACY, 
State Engineer of the State of Utah, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case 
No. 8058 
Brief of Respondents 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Boundary Springs Water Users Association is 
a non-profit corporation organized by the owners of 
water rights in :Mill Creek Canyon in the southeast part 
of Salt Lake County. The water rights are not in con-
troversy. They were adjudicated in the case of Martha 
Young, administratrix, vs. William Gordon, Executor of 
the Estate of Daniel Lund, deceased, et al., in what is 
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known aH tlw Morse Decree, signed by Judge Morse on 
t ltt> 1 ~t day of August, 1913. If any of the rights so adju-
dil':dt·d ltH\'P hl'Pll lost by abandonment and acquired by 
ad\'l·r~(· ll~P, 1-nwh i~HlieH are not before the court in this 
t'HHl'. 
By tlw :\I or~;e Dl·(·ree, Exhibit 2, the right to the use 
of t lw quaut it y of water decreed to various individuals 
was dt>Hignated as house use streams, and included in 
tlu· lh·<·n·t·, there was listed the ditches and individuals 
entitled to that special use of the water. (Exhibit 2, 
beginning page 2.) The appropriation of the water by 
beneficial use was begun by dipping from the creek or 
ditches taken out of the stream. That was the practice 
until the controversy out of which this litigation arose. 
l\Iill Cn.>l'k Canyon is for the most part in the United 
States Forest Preserve and the Government has provided 
conveniences for recreation from one end of the canyon 
to the other. The stream runs in an open channel and 
is contaminated from various sources to the extent that 
the water is wholly unfit for culinary uses. It, therefore, 
became necessary for the owners of the water to provide 
water free from contamination. 
At about one-half mile from the mouth of the canyon 
arises springs known as the Boundary Springs, which 
flow 3 or 4 second feet of water, free from contamination 
at the point where they arise. The owners of house 
streams decreed by the Morse Decree thought to provide 
sufficient of the pure water to meet their requirements 
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and accordingly, a large number of them organized the 
Boundary Springs \Ynter u~wrs Assoeintion, and by the 
.. Artieles of Ineorporation they subscribed, transferred 
to the corporation the full and complete right to divert 
the water from the springs into a pipeline and to convPy 
it through the pipeline to a point of distribution among 
the owners for enlinary, stock ·watering, lawn sprinkling 
and other domestic purposes. (Ex. 3, 4, 3, 6, 7 and 8.) 
Pursuant to the arrangement, they caused Applica-
tion X o. 70 to be filed in the Office of the State Engineer 
for the transfer of the water decreed to them, to the 
lower water users or water users not joining in the asso-
ciation and the withdrawal from the Boundary Springs 
of an equal amount of uncontaminated water to be con-
veyed to them as stated. In the part of the application, 
under the heading ''Explanatory,'' their purpose was 
stated as follows : 
It is the purpose of the applicant, a non-profit 
corporation, to divert the waters of Boundary 
Springs to the extent of two cubic feet per second, 
which water has heretofore commingled with 
waters of ~fill Creek Stream as referred to in the 
Morse decree, and to convey it as indicated 
through a pipeline to a point approximately 1,000 
feet East of the West quarter corner of Section 
36, T. 1 W., R. 1 E., S. L. B. & M. and there divide 
among the owners for culinary purposes and in 
lieu of \Yater so diverted to exchange for continu-
ous flow in Mill Creek stream a quantity equal 
to water so diverted, and which has heretofore 
been conveyed through the open ditches named in 
paragraph 11. 
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Paragraph 11 is a rider added to the application and 
cleHi~uatPH the ditches referred to in the Morse Decree 
ns the Ht illman-Russell Ditch, the Skidmore-Osguthorpe 
Ditt-b, tlH· Chamberlain Ditch and the Stillman-Hussey 
l>itt·h. (Exhibit 1.) 
At a pre-trial hearing, there was a discussion as 
to the issues in the case which resulted in the following 
stntement: 
~lit HOLMGREN: ... The chief proposition 
is that we have acquired this as a standby water 
right for the culinary use. Now, our chief objec-
tion is that the water of Boundary Springs has 
been discovered to be practically pure, free from 
contamination, whereas the creek flow becomes 
contaminated. (R. 24) 
And further : 
I think, assuming that we have succeeded to a 
culinary right, then the question is, has the one 
water user, where there are several users in the 
creek, has he a right to go up and take the pure 
water out of the spring and leave the contami-
nated water to the other regardless of the degree 
of contamination? Any degree, slight or great. 
(R. 27) 
THE COURT: "\Vell, that's another way of 
saying to the court that the granting of this appli-
cation possibly will interfere with the vested 
rights. 
MR. HOLMGREN: I think we can demon-
strate that there is a difference in contamination 
in the Boundary Springs, and that's the reason 
these people want it. 
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MR. HOLl\1:GREN: I can make a statement 
that I think would obviate any testimony at all: 
that there is a difference in the bacterial couni 
and that the taking of this pure water fl'om the 
spring tends to increase the bacterial count that 
is deliYered down, and the water that is delivered 
down would be to us and anybody else who used 
that ·water. (R. :27) 
On the 6th day of September, 1928, Salt Lake City 
entered into a contract with the White Ditch Irrigation 
Company for exchange of water and on other dates, 
entered into other agreements, (Exhibits 22, 23 and 24) 
for the exchange of water with the East Mill Creek 
Water Company and Lower Mill Creek Irrigation Com-
pany and without making application for change of place 
of use, point of diversion or nature of use to the State 
Engineer's office (as required by Sec. 73-3-3) proceeded 
to deliver other zcater to the ditches from which the city 
was to take water, delivered culinary water to the stock-
holders of the corporation with whom the exchanges 
were made and also irrigation water from Utah Lake, 
and in turn, withdrew water from Mill Creek proper 
including the Boundary Springs and used it at times 
prior to 1939. The city has not used any of the water 
from :Mill Creek directly since that date and has never 
at any time made application with the State Engineer 
to divert the waters of Boundary Springs or to take the 
Mill Creek water directly into the Salt Lake City water 
lines. 
In harmony with the issues stated on the pre-trial, 
evidence was offered and received showing the bacterial 
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t·ount al•ove und below the Boundary Springs (See Ex-
hil,its 30 and :n). No reliable conclusions can be drawn 
from the e\·id<·IH't> so offered, and there was no claim 
mad<· for 11H· present, at least, that Salt Lake City was or 
t'<lll Le lli'Cjudi<·ed from the granting of the application 
or hy the Dl·<·n·e of the court entered herein. 
Complaillt is made, however, that the Application 
~o. 70 was made upon tlw wrong form; that it should 
lm \'e bt•t•Il made upon an application for change of point 
of di\'ersion awl not upon an application for the exchange 
of watl·r. For the purpose of disclosing the differences 
in the two forms of application, there was received in 
evidence Exhibit D. Substantially the same information 
is called for in each application, and at the end, the 
<lpplieation calls for an explanatory statement. There 
is thus raised a highly technical question as to whether 
the release to the water users below the Boundary 
Springs and the intake at defendant's pipeline, of an 
amount of ·water equal in quantity to the amount taken 
out of Boundary Springs, is an exchange of water. 
\Vhile the Boundary Springs are tributaries of Mill 
Creek, the flow is not a part of Mill Creek until they 
reach the channel. Therefore, through the works named 
in the application, the users were taking the flow above 
Boundary Springs and the flow of Boundary Springs. 
After the granting of the application, they were taking 
no part of the flow of Mill Creek above or below Boun-
dary Springs but are taking the water directly from 
the Boundary Springs, a tributary, before it in fact be-
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comes a part of ~[ill Cn)l'k. \Yt:~, at this point, enll the 
court's attention to the fad that from the beginning, as 
disclosed in the testimony of :Marvin Taylor, the State 
Engineer directed the form to be used for the purposes 
intended and not only proYided the exchange form of 
application, but as indicated, changed the application, 
in form at least, that was filed. (R. 64-65.) 
There was introduced in evidence the rules and regu-
lations of the office of the State Engineer. (Exhibit 18) 
Paragraph 2, page 1, provides: 
2. ~\.n application received upon an improper 
or obsolete form, filled out in substantial compli-
ance with the law and accompanied by the proper 
fee, will be received. However, the applicant shall, 
upon request of the state engineer, replace it with 
an application on the proper form and make other 
necessary corrections within sixty days from the 
date of its transmittal to the applicant, otherwise 
the date of priority of the application will be 
brought down to the date when the application is 
filed in the proper form. 
We turn to a discussion of the points raised by 
appellant. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THERE WAS PROOF OF AVAILABILITY OF 
WATER OF LIKE QUALITY AND QUANTITY FOR 
THE PURPOSE USED AND THE GRANTING OF 
APPLICATION NO. 70 BY THE STATE ENGINEER 
WAS PROPER. 
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POINT II 
l'l' \\' AH NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO AF-
~,lHM 'l'HE DEClHION OF THE STATE ENGINEER 
1!\ APPHOVlNG APPLICA'rlON NO. 70 AND ALL 
PAR'l'IJi~H CO~CJi~lU\ED HAD PROPER NOTICE 
0~, THE HALD APPLIUATION. 
POI~T III 
'I' HE RIG I I 'rS OF 'l'HE APPLICANT WERE DESIG-
NATED IN THE ~IORSE DECREE AS "HOUSE 
VHE STREAl\IS" \VHICH, LIKE THE APPLICA-
TIOX IXl'LUDES STOCKWATERING AND IRRI-
UATIOX. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECREE-
I~G THAT THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO 
THE APPROVAL OF HIS APPLICATION AND TO 
A CERTIFICATE FROl\I THE STATE ENGINEER 
GRANTING A PERl\fANENT RIGHT TO DIVERT 
UP TO 1.5675 SECOND FEET OF WATER FROM 
BOUNDARY SPRINGS PURSUANT TO APPLICA-
TION NO. 70 UPON PROPER PROOF OF BENE-
FICIAL USE. 
POINT V 
THE DIVERTING OF WATER FROM BOUNDARY 
SPRINGS UNDER APPLICATION NO. 70 DOES 
NOT IMPROPERLY MODIFY OR CHANGE THE 
TERMS OF THE MORSE DECREE. 
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POINT Yl 
THE APPROY AL OF ..:\ PPLICATION NO. 70, 
vVHETHER DEEl\IED AN EXCHANGE OF WATER 
OR ~-\. CH~-\.XGE OF "~.ATER OR A CHANGE OF 
POIXT OF DIYERSIOX, DOES NOT INVADE THE 
RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT OR OF ANY OTHER 
0\YXERS OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATERS 
OF ~IILL CREEK . 
.ARGUJ\[E~T 
POINT I 
THERE \Y~-\.S PROOF OF AVAILABILITY OF 
WATER OF LIKE QUALITY AND QUANTITY FOR 
THE PURPOSE USED AND THE GRANTING OF 
APPLICATIOX XO. 70 BY THE STATE ENGINEER 
\Y.AS PROPER. 
Any person entitled to the use of water has a right 
to change the manner of using it or to exchange it for 
other water if the proposed change will not interfere 
with vested rights. Kinney on Water Rights, p. 1538. 
Even if vested rights will be interferred with, the owner 
of the water right is entitled to make the change if the 
order of approval can be made with conditions which 
will protect other vested rights. Very early in the de-
velopment of the law of appropriation attempts were 
made to limit the right to use water to its initial mode 
of enjoyment. However, the courts and legislatures of 
practically all of the Western states have held that the 
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watt·r right i~ independent of the mode of enjoyment, 
atu1 tltat dmnges may be made in the place of use, the 
poiut of di\'t'rHiou, or the mode of enjoyment. This 
gt•ttt·ral r;tatt·mPut is supported by all the general texts. 
~l't' "\\'il'l \Vatt·r HigiltH of the Western States," Vol. 1, 
pagc.> :,~!I; ·'Hutchins Selected Problems in the Law of 
\\'at•·r Hi~.dtts in the West," page 378; "Kinney on Irri-
~a t iou mal \Vater Rights," Vol. 2, page 1499. 
In etah the right to make a change in the mode of 
t•njoyment of water has been a rather frequent subject 
of litigation, and it may be considered as settled law that 
the right to make the change is granted by statute and 
will oHly be denied where the change will injure the 
vested rights of others, and where the order approving 
the change cannot be so conditioned as to protect those 
rights. See S'igurd City r. State, 105 Utah 278, 142 P. 
2d 134; Tanner~·. Humphries, 87 Utah 164, 148 P. 2d 484. 
In Tanner v. Humphries, supra, the court had before 
it a change application and an exchange. The plaintiff 
applicant was non-suited when he rested. He appealed 
to the Supreme Court. The court said: 
If the point of diversion may be changed and 
the exchange made as applied for by the plaintiff 
without affecting any vested right of the power 
company, or if a decree can be made containing 
such conditions as will safeguard the rights of 
the power company and at the same time permit 
of the delivery of water for municipal purposes, 
plaintiff is entitled to have her application 
granted. 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The court then indicated that the burden of proying- that 
the exchange could be made \Vas on the plaintiff, but 
that: 
* * * it may be that the plaintiff should put in 
general proof that the change will not injure or 
disturb Yested rights, but if so, it is rather in 
homage to the general rule that he is required to 
offer proof in support of all of his allegations, 
because as a practical matter those who protest 
·will most likely be better situated to know wherein 
they will be injured than will the plaintiff. 
Thus, applicant has a right to make the change unless 
it will interfere with the City's vested rights, and the 
City had the general responsibility of demonstrating to 
the Court the manner in which its rights will be impaired. 
It should also be noted that Section 73-3-20, U.C.A. 
1953, under which Application No. 70 was filed, provides 
that exchanges may be granted ''but in so doing the 
original water * * * must not be deteriorated in quality 
or diminished in quantity for the purpose used.'' It is 
respondents' contention that the appellant has made no 
showing to bring it within that part of the statute as 
the evidence is conclusive that the present use of the 
water of ~!ill Creek is exclusively for irrigation. 
The control over the water was effectually assigned 
to the Boundary Springs Water Users Association by 
the Articles of Incorporation and by the certificates of 
stock received in evidence as exhibit 5 and which pro-
vided: 
11 
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1'he iHHtuHwe and acceptance of this certificate 
ohall up(•rate aH a transfer to the Boundary 
Springs Watt-r Users Association of the right to 
apply to the ~tate Engineer of the State of Utah 
fur a pPrmit to change the point of diversion and 
ww of water owned by the holder of this certificate 
(·qual to .01 second feet of water for each share of 
Ht(wk <·\·id<•JH·ed by the certificate and the transfer 
of sueh wat('r Hhall be and remain irrevocable so 
long as this certificate is outstanding or until it 
is cancelled by order of the Board of Directors 
of the Association. 
'J:'he essence of appellant's Point I is that the appel-
lant failed to show that it (the corporation) had water 
available to put into Mill Creek steam in exchange for 
the water it proposed to take at Boundary Springs. The 
water of ~fill Creek is decreed by the Morse Decree, 
which was introduced in evidence. An abstract chart 
showing the conveyance from the decreed owner to the 
present owner was also admitted in evidence by stipu-
lation to show the various chains of title. The Morse 
Decree, plus the abstract chart and the list of stock-
holders, show that the stockholders of Boundary Springs 
are the owners of decreed water rights in Mill Creek. In 
addition to the power granted to Boundary Springs by 
the stockholders, as set forth in the stock certificate, the 
stockholders who were present testified that they were 
familiar with the application filed by Boundary Springs, 
that it was authorized on their behalf to make the appli-
cation, and that they affirmed and ratified its action. It 
was stipulated that each other stockholder of Boundary 
Springs would testify to the same effect as to his decreed 
12 
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water if he were called as a ~witlwss. \V P, then•t'on•, rP-
spectfully submit that Boundary Springs was authorized 
on behalf of the decreed owners of water to apply for 
the change described in the application. It was not con-
tradicted that these decreed owners who associated 
themselves together by forming a mutual non-profit 
water corporation, proposed to leaYe the water accruing 
under their decreed rights in l\Iill Creek to ~mpply the 
lower users and to take in exchange therefor a like quan-
tity of water from Boundary Springs. 
There is, of course, nothing unusual in the law of 
water rights for decreed owners to retain the ownership 
of the water rights themselves while transferring the 
right to manage, distribute and control to a mutual water 
company. This practice has been uniformly recognized 
by the decisions of this court. See, for example, Genola 
Tozcn v. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P. 2d 930, and 
East River Bottom v. Boyce, 102 Utah 149, 128 P. 2d 277. 
The objection raised by the City in this regard is 
purely technical. Technical objections are not looked 
upon by the courts with favor unless they are timely 
raised. The City filed a written protest, (see Ex. 14) 
and appeared before the State Engineer at a hearing to 
consider the approval or rejection of the application. 
The City failed to raise any objection at that time to the 
fact that the application was made by the corporation, 
rather than by the individual decreed owners. If there 
were any technical deficiency in this regard (which we 
deny), it could certainly have been cured at that point. 
13 
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~~urtlwr, this point is not raised by plaintiff's complaint, 
uor was it raised at the pre-trial. We submit that the 
Htipulatioll to the effect that each decreed owner would 
h•Ht i l'y tlta t lll' authorized the corporation to make this 
appli(·atio11, plus the authorization granted by the articles 
nud n•(·ited iu the stock <·ertificates, are adequate tore-
movt> thiH mutter from doubt. 
POINT II 
rr \VA~ NOT ERROR FOR THE COURT TO AF-
FIRM THE DECISION OF THE STATE ENGINEER 
IN APPHOVIXG APPLICATION NO. 70 AND ALL 
PARTIES CO?\CERNED HAD PROPER NOTICE 
OF THE SAID APPLICATION. 
This contention is extremely technical and after full 
consideration of the question as to whether the exchange 
form or the application for change of point of diversion 
form would be the correct form to use, we are convinced 
that the exchange form was as held by the State Engi-
neer, the correct form. The purpose was to release water 
from the right of diversion from the main channel of 
Mill Creek and in turn, to take the same quantity of 
water from the Boundary Springs before the flow from 
the Springs became a part of Mill Creek proper. As 
quoted in the brief for the appellants, the application was 
made upon blanks furnished by the State Engineer who 
made minor corrections. The purpose throughout was 
made perfectly clear and that is all that the law con-
templates. 
14 
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It is contended that the notiel', Exhibit 16, was in-
sufficient. The notice names the rights decreed in the 
Morse Decree and specifies that it is the purpose to divert 
the water from Boundary Springs and convey it through 
a pipeline for domestic and stock watering purposes and 
for incidental irrigation of la,vns and shrubs and that 
·water theretofore diverted would remain in the natural 
channel of _jiill Creek to satisfy other rights diverting 
from Mill Creek. There is no merit whatsoever in Point 
:2, for if there was error in using the wrong form, it was 
wai\ed by the State Engineer and by the plaintiff. 
The State Engineer, under various sections of Title 
73, is empowered to furnish the blanks upon which the 
various applications are to be made. By the same 
statutes, applicants are directed to use the blanks fur-
nished by the State Engineer; see, for example, Sections 
73-3-2, 73-3-3 and 73-5-13. The statute dealing with ex-
changes, (73-3-20) merely requires the application to be 
in writing. 
Also, by express statute (73-2-1) the State Engineer 
has been granted power ''to make and publish such rules 
and regulations as may be necessary from time to time 
fully to carry out the duties of his office.'' The rules 
and regulations of the State Engineer were introduced 
in evidence as Exhibit 18. Rule 8 provides that applica-
tions shall be made only upon the printed forms fur-
nished by the State Engineer. Thirteen separate types 
of application blanks are thereafter enumerated. Para-
graph 2, page 2 then provides : 
15 
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Au application received upon an improper or 
ol~sol('tt~ form, filled out in substantial compliance 
w~th the law,, and accompanied by the proper fee, 
w1ll he recmved. However, the applicant shall 
upon n·quest of the State Engineer replace it with 
au appli<·ation on a proper form. 
N ('it IH·r tlu· rules nor the statutes set forth any par-
ti('ular crit•·ria for determining which of the thirteen 
hlauks should be used for a particular purpose. The 
ehange and exchange application forms were introduced 
in t•\·idence at the trial to show the similarity of the 
information requested. Reference to the photographs 
introduced in evidenee shows that Boundary Springs 
issue from the bank of the stream, but the water can be 
successfully captured before it reaches the stream by 
a concrete wall and drain field, located between the 
springs and the creek. Whether Boundary Springs and 
l\Iill Creek are two separate and distinct sources of water, 
so that they should be covered by an exchange applica-
tion, might be debatable. The State Engineer directed 
that the exchange blank be used. He had the authority 
to so require under both the statutes and his rules and 
regulations. The applicant complied with the State 
Engineer's instructions in this regard. (R. 64-65.) 
This is another technical matter raised by the City 
for the first time during the trial. It was not raised in 
the written protest filed with the State Engineer, nor at 
the hearing before the State Engineer, nor in the com-
plaint, nor at the pre-trial. Nor has the City alleged, 
nor proved how it claims to have been prejudiced by the 
16 
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ust' of one blank rather than the other. The t~ity is not 
in the position of haYing been mislead by the notice into 
failing to prott>st or participate in the proceedings. It 
did appear in eYery stage of the proceedings. It fully 
knew at all times what was proposed. 
The City has not shown, nor can it show, any preju-
dice to it, and it is respectfully submitted that the City 
is not entitled to prevail on Point II. 
POINT III 
THE RIGHTS OF THE APPLICANT WERE DESIG-
XATED IN THE MORSE DECREE AS "HOUSE 
USE STREA~IS'' WHICH, LIKE THE APPLICA-
TION INCLUDES STOCKWATERING AND IRRI-
GATION. 
The use of the water decreed under the Morse Decree 
and the use of the water to be made through the pipeline 
from Boundary Springs, as stated in Application No. 70, 
under "Explanatory" and paragraph 12, was for do-
mestic and stock watering purposes. Certainly domestic 
use in this country would include lawn sprinkling and 
minor irrigation of garden vegetables, if any, provided 
an excessive amount of water is not used. 
Apparently the City's contention is that because the 
''house use stream'' given by the Morse Decree included 
the use of the water for irrigation purposes, while the 
application filed merely specified the use as for "domestic 
and stock watering purposes,'' the application could not 
17 
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hl· appro\'l'd. We lwlieve that the application sufficiently 
rl'fll't't:-; that it is the intention to transfer these "house 
HHt• streams'' from Mill Creek to Boundary Springs to 
tlw full l•xtent of the 1.5675 e.f.s., decreed rights; and 
that Uw water is to be used for household purposes. 
'l'lw authorities support the concept that "domestic 
u~t·" it; sy11ouymous with "household use" and includes 
l'uliuary, lawu and garden watering and livestock water-
ing. ln Bountiful City v. DeLuca, 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 
194, at page 119 of the Utah Reports, the Utah Court 
was considering the meaning of a statute and indicated 
that the term ''use for domestic purposes" includes 
watering livestock. In "Gould on Waters," Section 205, 
page 397, Third Ed., it is stated that: 
The term ''domestic purposes'' extends to culi-
nary and household purposes, to the watering of 
a garden, and to the cleaning and washing, feed-
ing and supplying the ordinary quantity of cattle. 
It would appear to extend also to brewing, and 
the washing of carriages, but it does not include 
such manufacturing uses as grinding, washing 
and cooling of rubber. 
See also, "Wiel, \Yater Rights in the Western 
States," page 798, footnote 22, and "Kinney on Irriga-
tion and Water Rights,'' Vol. 2, page 1195. 
Here again the City raises a highly technical point, 
which was not presented in its protest to the State Engi-
neer, nor at the hearing before the State Engineer, nor 
in its complaint, nor at the pre-trial, nor do we remember 
the matter having been argued at all before the trial 
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court. Xor does the City 11ow ~how the manner in which 
it could be prejudiced in this regard. ThP q un 11 tit y of 
watPr which the applicant seeks to l)xehange emhnH'('H 
all of the water decreed to its stockholders by i ht' l\1 onH~ 
Decree. It totals 1.5673 e.f.s. The exact manner in which 
they intend to take and use the water is specified, and is 
characterized ns for "domestic and stock watering pur-
poses.·~ The term ''domestic uses'' is not defined in the 
application, but it is used as it has been uniformly used 
in the administration of water rights in this state to 
govern all normal and ordinary household uses. It was 
in this sense that the streams decreed to the applicant's 
stockholders were characterized by the Morse Decree 
as ''house use'' streams, for in Finding 6, the court 
referred to a "continuous stream for culinary, stock 
watering, domestic and irrigation purposes, being 
streams commonly known as house use streams.'' The 
application is adequate in this regard, and the court 
should not in any event look with favor upon technical 
arguments such as this raised for the first time on appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECREE-
ING THAT THE APPLICANT IS ENTITLED TO 
THE APPROVAL OF HIS APPLICATION AND TO 
A CERTIFICATE FROM THE STATE ENGINEER 
GRANTING A PERMANENT RIGHT TO DIVERT 
UP TO 1.5675 SECOND FEET OF WATER FROM 
BOUNDARY SPRINGS PURSUANT TO APPLICA-
19 
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TION NO. 70 UPON PROPER PROOF OF BENE-
~~H 'IAL USE. 
'rhe deeree of the court, as drafted and submitted, 
nppro\'Pd and <'oufirmed the issuance of Permit No. 70, 
and it dPen•ed the right to divert and use up to 1.5675 
~-'l'l~OIHl fpet of water of Boundary Springs pursuant to 
Appli('ation No. 70. Protective provisions are inserted 
in tltP dl·c·rpe to the effect that the decreed water would 
be under the supervision and control of the court com-
mi~:-;ioner as provided in the Morse Decree, and it was 
without prejudice to the right of any claimant to the 
water of Mill Creek to initiate and prosecute a plenary 
suit or suits for the adjudication of the claims of all 
water users of :\I ill Creek, whether claiming under the 
Morse Decree or otherwise. The court concludes that 
such issues are not before the court and then the court 
directs the State Engineer to issue a certificate showing 
authority to make a change, the certificate to contain a 
provision to the effect that the granting of the appli-
cation is without prejudice to vested interest. 
The court, of course, without express language, 
contemplated that proof of the diversion and beneficial 
use of the water would be made as required by the 
statute. In other words, we read into the decree the 
statutory provisions respecting the change of water 
which are fundamental to all water rights. That is the 
water must be diverted and beneficially used and proof 
must be submitted before the right to the use is perfected 
and a certificate issued. 
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POI.Nrr V 
THE DIYERTING OF 'YATER FROM BOUNDARY 
SPRIXGS lTXDER APPLICATION NO. 70 DOES 
N"OT l~IPROPERLY ~IODIB--,Y OR CHANGE THE 
TER~IS OF THE :MORSE DECREE. 
Every change in the point of diversion or exchange 
of water to a certain extent modifies pre-existing rights. 
TI.1e rights modified, however, are not with respect to 
the ownership of the water but only as to the change of 
point of dhTersion, change of place of use or exchange 
of use. Our statutes provide for such changes and every 
decree that is ever entered has been subject to such 
subsequent changes. It does not follow, however, that 
such changes are in any respect prejudicial to other 
water users. 
The City seems to be asserting that once water has 
been decreed no change application can thereafter be 
filed, which would to any extent modify the decree. No 
authority is cited for the proposition, and of course none 
could be. ~lost of the water rights in the state are de-
creed, and change applications are constantly filed and 
approved. In fact, the statutes contemplate that change 
applications can only be filed on perfected water rights. 
Section 73-3-3 limits the making of changes to persons 
"entitled" to the use of water. Changes by individuals 
who have not yet perfected their rights are governed 
by Section 73-3-6. It would serve no useful purposes to 
cite the numerous cases in which this court has affirmed 
the approval of change applications where the water 
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ri~ltts iuvolvPd had already been covered by court de-
('l'l'L'H. Ou" such example, however, is Tarvner v. Humph-
t·it·s, supra, 87 Utah 164. 
'l'he only otlwr argument made by the City under 
Poiut V iH that if the water decreed to each particular 
dit<"h iH dimiuiHhed, by placing part of it in a pipeline, 
tlw remaiuiug water must stand more loss from seepage 
:ttul p\·a pora t iotJ. TIH~n~ is no evidence that there would 
he a11y loss. It is not true that all ditches lose water. 
Soml· ditehes are eoHstructed through areas where the 
ground water is high and the ditches collect water and 
to a certain extent act as drains. There are also ditches 
through areas where the ground is so compacted that it 
is almost impervious to water. Without any evidence 
to the effect that the water rights remaining in the ditches 
will be adversely affected, the City is "literally grasping 
at straws." Further, the city is not the owner of the 
ditches, or of the right to use water through them. If 
the City ev·er exercises the rights which it claims under 
its exchange applications, the flow of Mill Creek will be 
placed in a pipeline and taken to Salt Lake City. There 
is no complaint from any individual who owns any 
interest in any of these ditches, and the City is not in a 
position to complain on behalf of the ditch owners. 
POINT VI 
THE APPROVAL OF APPLICATION NO. 70, 
WHETHER DEEMED AN EXCHANGE OF WATER 
OR A CHANGE OF WATER OR A CHANGE OF 
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POIXT OF DIYER8IOX, DOES NOT INVADE TIIM 
RIGHTS OF THE APPELLANT OR OF .ANY OTI-IER 
(Y\YXEHS OF RIUHTS TO THE USE OF WATERS 
OF _JIILL CREEK. 
Point YI is the only point under whirh the City has 
attempted to show that the approval of this application 
will in any way prejudice it. It asserts that the City 
has a ,-ested right to have the pure ·water of Boundary 
Springs continue to flow into and commingle with the 
polluted water of ~Iill Creek, so as to some extent 
diminish the degree of pollution. Mill Creek is so pol-
luted that the water from it is not fit for human consump-
tion. The City has the power to control the watershed 
of _JJill Creek and stop the sources of pollution. See 
Section 10-8-15. But it has not seen fit to do so. 
~Iill Creek Canyon is jammed throughout the sum-
mer. There is probably no canyon in the state which is 
more heavily used for recreational purposes. Numerous 
picnicing areas and recreational facilities are established 
and maintained in the Canyon, and the necessary result 
of this recreational use is pollution of the water supply. 
(R. 101.) 
When the :Morse Decree was entered nearly 40 years 
ago, the people who settled in the mouth of Mill Creek 
Canyon appropriated the water for their farms and for 
household uses, and the water was safe to drink. The 
court recognized this use and decreed to these settlers 
house use streams. As the development of the canyon 
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for recreational purposes increased, the water become 
more und more contaminated and became so bad in 1939 
thnt tIt(' ( ~ity was required to abandon it, because even 
wit It ehlorination the water could not be made safe. 
(H. !1!1, 100.) 
Tit(' culinary users which made the exchange with 
tltt· ( ~ity, Ita\'(' since the date of the exchange in 1923, 
hl'l'll supplied and are now being supplied with culinary 
watl•r by the City, and the City until 1939 took Mill 
Creek for l'ity use. This involved a change in point of 
diversion. It also involved a change in place of use. We 
contend it also involved a change in the purpose or 
manner of use. The City (although it wants to be ex-
tremely technical with us) made this change without 
attempting to comply with any of the requirements of 
the Ftah statutes. It now comes in and asserts that it 
is the owner of a "'rested" right to use Mill Creek for 
culinary use and to have Boundary Springs commingle 
with the polluted water of Mill Creek. 
The City states in its brief that it intends to install 
a filtration plant. At times l\Iill Creek is so polluted 
that it cannot be brought up to safe standards, even 
with filtration. This does not frequently happen, and 
probably with even a token effort by the City to 
control the watersheds the water could be made fit for 
human consumption with filtration and complete treat-
ment. It is significant, however, to note that the City 
did not attempt to show that the water could be rendered 
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
- -
fit for human use if Boundary Springs is left to com-
mingle with .Mill Creek, but that the water eannot be 
rendered fit for human use if Boundary Springs is taken 
out. Xor did the City attempt to show that the cost of 
treatment would be increased if Boundary Springs is 
taken out. The eYidence, "·ithout conflict, shows that 
with Boundary Springs left in or with Boundary Springs 
taken out, the waters of :Mill Creek cannot be used for 
domestic use with simple chlorination. Certainly the 
Yery small quantity of water issuing from Boundary 
Springs, as against the very large quantity of water 
flowing in ~Iill Creek, is not going to dilute the pollution 
to the extent of making any substantial difference to 
the City if it decides it wants to treat the water. 
The City states on page 27 of its brief that "on the 
a rerage" the water is more pure below Boundary 
Springs than above it. Reference to the exhibits will 
show, however, that on numerous occasions the water 
immediately below Boundary Springs is more polluted 
than the water immediately above. The sources of pol-
lution are so close to the stream that even after Boundary 
Springs are released into Mill Creek and the pollution 
is diluted at the point of commingling, within 100 feet 
below the point of commingling, the water is worse than 
it was above Boundary Springs. The evidence, therefore, 
totally fails to show that the City receives any benefit 
whatsoever from having Boundary Springs commingle 
with Mill Creek and from having all the water issuing 
from the canyon polluted. 
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A more striking example of a "dog in the manger" 
attitude would be hard to find. The City says, "We ad-
mit that Mill Creek is so polluted that we had to abandon 
it H llHL', bt-L· a use simple chlorination would not render it 
~ar,.. \V e would, nevertheless, like the people who reside 
on tilL· land at mouth of Mill Creek Canyon to use this 
polluted water, bt~eause at some future date the City 
might waut to use the water for culinary purposes." 
\\'lwu thi~ future date arrives, if it ever does, the City 
admits that the waters of .\Iill Creek must be filtered 
and completely treated. The City does not contend that 
tl1is treatment and filtration would be more expensive, 
more troublesome, or in any way detrimental to the City, 
because of the fact that Boundary Springs is not com-
mingling with ~!ill Creek. In fact, every natural impli-
cation would be and the exhibits show that the small 
quantity of water in Boundary Springs commingling with 
the large quantity of water in Mill Creek in a canyon 
where the source of pollution is very near the stream, 
could not have and does not have any material effect on 
the amount of stream pollution. The Supreme Court in 
Tauuer v. Humphries, supra, has laid down the rule that 
the person claiming that his rights will be prejudiced 
should show in particular how they will be prejudiced. 
This, the City has not done. It just relies on the general 
principle that if you put one gallon of pure water with 
100 gallons of polluted water, the degree of pollution in 
the 101 gallons will be somewhat less. We do not con-
ceive the law to be that the City can prevail simply by 
showing that there is an infinitesimal effect on the 
stream. 
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In '' I~inney on Irrigation and \Vater Rights,'' Vol. 
~' page 1538, it is stated that n change in the manner 
of using water should be permitted unless the inter-
ference with the rights of others is a ''real s ubsfantial 
injury," which seriously affects the rights of others; 
that a mere fanciful trifling injury will not prevent the 
change. Says Kinney : 
Upon the question of an extent of an injury 
to the vested rights of others, which must exist 
before any change is prevented, we will say here 
that it must be of such a nature that it is a real 
substantial injury, and seriously affecting the 
rights of others. A mere fanciful or trifling in-
jury will not prevent the change. 
Kinney also agrees with the general statement from 
Tanner c. Humphries, that the burden rests upon the 
person claiming injury. On page 538 he states: 
A water right, being a property right of the 
highest order, its owner may do what he wishes 
with his own, including the making of such changes 
as he sees fit to make, provided that he does not 
materially injure the rights of others in making 
them. * * * The restriction to the right to make 
the change that others must not be injured by the 
change, is a matter of defense; and, therefore, 
the burden of proof showing that injuries have 
been done to the rights of others is upon the one 
seeking damage for injuries actually committed 
or seeking an injunction. * * * The injury to the 
rights of others must be proven, as is any other 
fact, by the party alleging the injury. 
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The other text writers also speak of "material" or 
''substantial'' interference with the rights of others. See 
''Hutchins Law of Water Rights in theW est,'' page 378. 
rrherefore, the fanciful contention of the City that 
it gPtH ht•Jlefit from having Boundary Springs become 
pollutt•d, so that to some infinitesimal degree the pollu-
tion of Mill Creek is diluted, is not a basis for denying 
the change. Even with the careful testing of the water 
hPlow and above the springs, as shown by Exhibit 30, 
31 and 3~, it is difficult to determine any substantial 
improvement in the water after Boundary Springs com-
mingles with ~Iill Creek. In fact, on many, many occa-
sions the water is worse below the point of commingling 
than it was above the point of commingling. The same 
general principle obtains as to fanciful losses in evapora-
tion or seepage, because there is less water in the ditches. 
The burden was on Salt Lake City to come forward to 
show a substantial interference with its rights, because, 
as Ki1mey says, the change should be permitted unless 
there is serious substantial interference and that fanciful 
and technical injuries will be disregarded. 
The plaintiff in this case has instituted and prose-
cuted a suit that is wholly without equity. It has never 
itself made application for change of point of diversion 
or exchange of water or for the right to beneficially use 
Boundary Springs. The water has flowed continuously 
into Mill Creek channel and has become polluted to the 
extent that it is wholly unfit for culinary use. Plaintiff's 
objection now is based not upon any use or immediate 
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~ · intention to nsl' the water itself. HaYing made no appli-
~. S:- cation for change of point of diYersiou, or to change 
~~ ·, the place of USl\ or to change irrigation water for culi-
nary \Yater, it Sl'eks nothing whatsoever by its complaint. 
- , There is reference to a sta11dby use of the water, but the 
City has done nothing that would make the water avail-
able no matter how desperate the situation may be among 
the residents of the City. There is nothing in the record 
--: to indicate that Salt Lake City ever intends to or could 
utilize the water for the reason that contamination is so 
great that it would not, without complete treatment, be 
made fit for consumption. So far as the record discloses, 
_Jiill Creek will run in perpetuity as it has been running 
since the beginning of time and yet the City seeks to 
prevent the rightful owners of house use streams from 
diverting the Boundary Springs into a pipeline and 
thereby saving the water from pollution for their own 
beneficial uses strictly in accordance with their decreed 
rights. 
FORFEITURE IS NOT A PROPER ISSUE 
We do not believe that the question of whether the 
City has forfeited its water rights is a proper issue. It 
could not have been decided by the State Engineer. The 
issues in this court and in the district court are the same 
as they were before the State Engineer. See Eardley v. 
Terry, 94 Utah 367, 77 P. 2d 362. We do not desire to 
have this court pass upon that issue. The trial court 
at the pre-trial indicated that it was not an issue and 
no evidence was introduced thereon by either party. It 
29 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
may 11l' that if the City ever attempts to assert its rights 
iu \1 ill Cn·ek by using it for culinary use, that the 
appli,·ant will dPHire to assert this question of forfeiture. 
\\' l', 1 h'·n·fon·, uo not waut the argument of the City to 
}IHHH mmote<i, :-;o that the Supreme Court settles this 
i~~~~~· for them by letting them in "through the back 
door." It iH twt at all established in the water law of 
thi:-; !"tate that a <·ity <·am1ot forfeit its water rights. Sec-
t ion 7::-1-~ <·<'rtainly :-;o intends, and the only case we 
ar1· awan· of where the issue was presented and decided 
iH .1/t. 0/icd ('t,mdery Assn. r. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 
193, :2:3:1 P. 876, and there the court did hold that Salt 
Lake ( 'ity hau forfeited its water right. The contention 
that the City must appropriate water beyond its present 
needs is adequately taken care of by Section 73-1-4, 
which permit:-; the cities to obtain a non-use permit. 
That section expressly provides: 
Such applications for extension shall be 
granted by the State Engineer for periods not 
exceeding five years each, upon a showing of 
reasonable cause for such non-use. Financial 
crisis * * * or the holding of a water right without 
use by any municipality, metropolitan water dis-
trict, or other public agencies to meet the reason-
able future requirements of the public, shall con-
stitute reasonable cause for such non-use. 
In this case all users of culinary water from Mill 
Creek, except the stockholders of the applicant, have 
been getting their culinary water since the 1920's from 
Salt Lake City. Salt Lake City, without a change appli-
cation, used the water for culinary purposes in the City 
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until 1939, but from 1939 until the datt> of this trial 
tlwre ha::-; been no use whnh'Yt>r of the water for enlinary 
purposes, except by the stockholders of the applicant. 
\Yhether any culinary right could be kept alive by irri-
gation usages is debatable. There is also considerable 
doubt that the City is the owner of any culinary rights, 
because it did not file the required applications, and if 
anybody did assign any culinary rights to the City under 
the exchange agreements, the quantity is exceedingly 
small. \Y e, therefore, ask the court not to rule upon this 
question of forfeiture, because it was not presented to, 
nor passed upon by, the trial court, and the evidence 
which would be necessary to an intelligent determination 
of the issue is not before the court. 
THE ISSrE IS: HAS THE BOUNDARY SPRINGS 
\VATER USERS ASSOCL\_TION THE RIGHT TO 
A PERjiiT TO WITHDR~\_ W PURE CULINARY 
WATER FRQji THE BOUNDARY SPRINGS TO 
THE EXTEXT OXLY OF ITS STOCKHOLDERS' 
HOUSE STREAji RIGHTS BEFORE IT IS POL-
LUTED BY CQjijiiXGLING WITH MILL CREEK 
OR jirST IT STAND BY AND PERMIT THE 
WATER, WHICH THEY OWN IN PART AT 
LEAST, TO BECO::\IE POLLUTED TO THE EX-
TENT THAT IT CANNOT BE USED FOR CULI-
~ARY PURPOSES BY ITS MEMBERS. 
The court will bear in mind that the house streams, 
as defined in the Morse Decree, mean the water which 
the decreed owners had used from time immemorial for 
culinary and household purposes directly from the creek 
bed and the various ditches through which it was with-
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drawu. ( iollditions have changed until as disclosed by 
Uw n•<·ord, the water is now polluted to the extent that 
it i~ 11ot useable even by chemical treatment. 
Salt Lake City, notwithstanding its claim of owner-
ship of irrigation water, has never applied for a permit 
to ('huuge the use or to divert and use Boundary Springs 
or Mill < :rt•<·k waters for culinary purposes. Nor has it 
upplil'd to change the point of diversion or place of use. 
By the pleadings and the record, the question of dividing 
of the Boundary Springs water is wholly moot, for no 
litigant asks for a division, and of course, there being 
no issue, neither the State Engineer nor the district 
court could make it. At some future time such an issue 
may be presented, and the court may then determine it. 
Further, nearly all of the owners of house use streams 
are stockholders of the applicant. The total house use 
streams (both applicant's and third parties') decreed 
by the Morse Decree will seldom, if ever, exceed the 
flow of Boundary Springs. If all of the house use stream 
owners desired to take their water from Boundary 
Springs it probably would be adequate for all. No one 
has filed an application to change for that or to change 
from irrigation to domestic use. Irrigation users cer-
tainly can not complain. If all house use stream owners 
did desire to go to Boundary Springs, other questions 
may then be presented to the court, such as the right of 
the users to share equally in the pure water. If change 
applications are filed by the City to convert irrigation 
water rights into culinary water rights and to take the 
water from the Boundary Springs instead of from the 
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l\lill Creek channel, those change applications will be 
junior to this one. It may be claimed that Salt Lake City, 
by failing to use the water, has lost it by abandonment. 
The effect of the prior application of Boundary Springs 
"\Yater Users Association may be presented. 
X one of the questions suggested have been put in 
issue in this case and this application should be ap-
proved. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J.D. SKEEN 
EDWARD W. CLYDE 
Attorneys for 
Boundary Springs 
E. R. CALLISTER · 
Attorney General 
ROBERT B. PORTER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for State Engineer 
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